137 241 [248] koba (Musa ensete) is grown. This is used for making ropes of all kinds and bags for grain. In the south, the roots and inner parts of the plant are also used to make flour for 262 food; but the Amhara despise this, considering it "food of [186] slave peoples".

137 Vegetation is dense in the valleys, and the forests contain many valuable trees, including the Natal yellow pine. But in spite of the high yearly rainfall the northern plateau is comparatively little wooded. Foresters estimate that only 2.8% of Ethiopia is forest-covered, although they believe that it was once well forested. They ascribe this denuding to centuries of uncontrolled grazing and periodic burning-over. The best hardwoods that remain are usually in the least accessible spots, lowlands and gorges.[7]

137 313 The two most important trees of the highlands are the Ted and the Zegba. The Ted, a juniper (Juniperus procera) sometimes referred to as "pencil cedar" (or Juniperus phoenicoea), is fine-grained, easy to split, aromatic, durable (even when exposed to moist conditions in the rainy season), and termite-resistant. It is popular for beams in the better houses of chiefs, and for the simple native furniture. The Zegba(Podocarpus gracilor), also an evergreen, is found in the warmer parts of the plateau. The wood is soft, easy to split, subject to decay when exposed to moisture, and thus more popular in drier areas. Non-resinous and tasteless, it is useful as a container for food, but is mainly used for construction and furniture. On the higher plateau

7. Chamber of Commerce of Addis Ababa: Guidebook of Ethiopia 1954, pp. 127-8; Huo: Ethiopia, 1955, p.1-2; Simmons:Global Epidemiology, 1951, p.63.

1: Messing E-5 (1953-1954)1957 MP5 Amhara MP5

PART III: SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

171 Some aspects of the social organization of the Amhara resemble those of medieval Europe at early and middle periods; others the ancient and not so ancient Middle East; still others, perhaps a smaller part, parallel patterns in other parts of Africa. It is an "old-world" pattern of human relationships, both in structure and function, and the noteworthy fact is that much has survived, due to comparative isolation, that has changed elsewhere.

186 Amhara attitudes, concomitant with their social organization, recall the attitude of the "Neolithic pattern of human relations" in Coon's terminology.[69] This pattern is characterized by the attitude: "You stay in your village, and I stay in mine. If your sheep eat our grass we will kill you. Anyone who tries to change our ways is a witch and we will kill him."

In Amhara rural areas--and most Amhara are rural--this attitude still seems to dominate human relations, be they structured as territorial, class, military, legal, ethnic, religious or racial. Feuds between kin groups often last for several generations; loyalties are intensely regional and ethnocentric.

178 While all this can still be observed, change in the direction of modern occidental patterns has begun to seep in very recently, affecting various phases of social organization in varying degrees. Sometimes the structure

69. Coon: The Story of Man. 1954.

778 Geez). Here the bread and wine used in the eucharist are
346 prepared and stored with great secrecy. The utensils of
251 the nearby cooking hut, the baking pan "metad" and large clay jars for barley beer, are also stored here. Supplies of tyeff, barley, wheat, beans, peas, may also be stored.

779 In recent years, church parades feature prominent-
186 ly the flag of the nation, the red-green-yellow of the central government, emphasizing in modern ways the close union of church and state that has long been traditional in Abyssinia.

(e) Worship and Devotional Poetry.

533 The musical chants and notations studies formally
796 have already been outlined in connection with church education.

Church hymns, including devotional poetry, are called "qene" in a generic rather than specifically accurate sense. A collection of them is contained in the book "gubae qana", and they are sung in a special mode. The chief mode is called "selt". It has three variations:

(1) "geez" - short tones, dedicated to the "Father";

(2) "ezel" - mournful tones in minor key, dedicated to the "Son" 's passion;

(3) "araray" - long, drawn-out tones, dedicated to the "Holy Ghost".

These variations are interlaced, for special results, and for specific occasions. The mass, "qeddase" (lit. a notification) is chanted in a mode bearing the

796 The holy day which now symbolized most strongly the union of church and state occurs just after the climax of the rainy season. On the 7th day of the monthe of Nahase occurs the feast of the Trinity, "Selassyē", which the present emperor adopted as his imperial name at coronation. On this day, the "tabot" from the local "Selassyē" church is taken on a colorful, though usually rain-drenched parade. In some regions this feast is called "Abba Abraham", because it is believed that the day also commemorates the Old Testament event when 3 angels visited Rather Abraham. The parade includes also many national flags of the (secular) state, and photographs of the bearded emperor, carried by deacons. Loyalty shouts of "Addis Ababa" are frequently heard. [184]

The last important socio-religious holy day is "Buhē", the Transfiguration of Jesus, on the 13th of the same month. It is also called "Dabra Tabor", because it is believed to have taken place on Mt. Tabor in ancient Palestine. Again a church bearing that name is chosen as center of the celebration. Buhe is also a feast of lights, perhaps to symbolize the hope that the raincloud will soon part and let the sun be seen once again. There are torchlight parades, the torches made from braided, resinous barks, carried on the way to the church just before sunrise. All shout "Buhe, Buhe" on many occasions on this day. It is a family holiday remembered all through life by the children. On this day the hearths are brightly lit, and mothers bake a special wheaten bread for the children. Even [373]

197 192 most of its syntax, morphology (such as the "frequentative"), phonology such as considerable onomatopoetry and monosyllabic words (though some of these may have been carried in Geez also). The result of this linguistic blend is a number of expressive choices somewhat analogous to the choice in English between Anglo-Saxon cognates and Latin-French cognates: e.g. the word "sun" can be expressed as "sahay" (from Geez) or "jembar" (from Cushitic). Amhara people use these alternates in many ways: to emphasize distinction between "sacred" and "profane", between the philosophic and the prosaic.

578 197 186 For, to the mind of the Amhara, Geez and its derivatives are spiritually connected with the church liturgy, with philosophy. Even in the present situation of change, feudal conservatives and the church have banded together most strongly against the suggested simplification of the Amharic alphabet (which is recommended for quicker learning, expecially by illiterate adults of other ethnic groups in Ethiopia; and for devising typewriters). This traditional, religious conservatism is now being reinforced by the new and incipient group of nationalistic, linguistic purists, who bemoan the introduction of more and more European cognates. But the latter group is still small and does not have nearly the political power of the old-style religious conservatives.

197 Finally, the often-repeated qualification with regard to the effect of regional differences applies to linguistic matters also. In different regions, derivations from different Cushitic languages affect all phases of the language, particularly the lexical.

192 b) Lexical, Grammatical and Syntactical Phases.

The Amharic vocabulary is rich in onomatopoetic terms which have been formalized:

524 girls, or two girls holding each other by the hand and spinning like a top. Sometimes somewhat older girls meet boys with whom they have established an experimental "joking relationship" ("tawaza"), and play house, building little huts out in the fields during the dry season, within the hamlet in the rainy season. This free experimentation comes to an end just before adolescence, when their relationships become more formal and more supervised.

Imitations of parental activities fill much of children's playtime. Little boys play "farmer", weave rainhoods of reeds and "broadcast" seeds (actually pebbles). Little boys begin to practice the "art of insult" (brain, not only brawn) e.g. such ethnocentric insults as the following:

[186
578]

	Question: "Where are you from?"
Reply: "Begemdir",	Response: "Land of shysters and quibblers."
"Shoa",	"Land of liars and traitors."
"Gojjam",	"Land of sorcerers (buda)."
"Gondar",	"Gossipers and blabbermouths."
"Curagé",	"Land of tricksters."
"Tigré",	"Land of hotheads."

524 754 The culture's fear of black magic, especially "buda", is reflected in children's games, such as:

A: "Buda, buda, what do you eat?"

B: "Meat" (or, imitating the sorcerer's hidden language, "cakes").

A: "What do you drink?"

B: "Blood" (or, paraphrased, "pure water"). Whereupon boy B howls like a hyena (the "horse" of buda), sprints toward boy A, who flees.

524 831 When no adults are present, boys play games imitating the sex life of animals, sometimes highly imaginary, e.g. the "coitus of baboons" ("zätota beddosh");

Seated and facing each other, two boys lift each other with their feet,

1: Messing E-5 (1953-1954)1957 MP5 Amhara MP5

776 kingdom. The hyena ("jeb") is regarded as acting sometimes as the
825 "horse" of the evil spirit or human sorcerer, sometimes as a werewolf-
like creature, when the evil spirit or human sorcerer assumes its form
at night, or makes use of its powerful, hypnotic eyes to "draw the
[755] blood" magically from the living victim. The concept of the magical
hyena is much used in diagnosis and treatment of mental ailments. It
is the most common wild animal, seen and heard at night, and the holes
it burrows under fresh human graves are regarded as visible evidence
of the character of the hyena. The fear in which the spiritual world
is held is symbolized in the hyena; it is whispered about in connection
with suspected ethnic craft groups such as the smiths; or shouted out
loud in military unison ("yabahalal jebo") in challenge.

825 Aspects of the animal world which cause great "wonderment" among
homespun Amhara "shemagalye" philosophers are types of animal behavior
that seem so human. "Bird language" is given a variety of popular
interpretations (footnote 102). Baboons, which are a constant
annoyance and therefore familiar, are wondered about in part because
of their human-like social organization headed by "great man" chiefs
("ramare").

But it is a great insult to call a person a "creature of Thursday"
(when animals were created, according to the Bible).

186 B. Amhara Ideas about Human Races and Amhara Ethnocentrism.
829 The dualism of the Amhara culture pattern rules also their view
of the human races with which they are familiar, and their own

Footnote 102 - Leslau: Popular Interpretations of Bird Sounds in Ethiopia.
Journal of American Folklore, 1952, Vol. 65,
pp. 361-4.

186 ethnocentrism: "Je" includes the brunette racial features of the
829 Mediterranean world, particularly if accompanied by Abyssinian-Coptic religion, for to the Amhara the name "Amhara" is synonymous with Christianity of their own denomination. "They", in their mind, refers to the black peoples of Africa whom they enslaved; but also to "infidel", particularly the Muslims with whom they have been at war so often. They draw many lines within these major ethnocentric divisions, racial, religious, ethnic-occupational and linguistic.. But, in the Amhara attitude, racial differences are among the most fundamental.

829 The skin color of most Amhara is regarded by them as brown
822 ("täym"), considered better looking than the black of negroid peoples, and reflecting "better character". Black color is regarded as symbolic of anything unpleasant, spiritually impure, ("täqqorä" connotes "he became shadowed, sad, depressed"). It is a (mild) insult to call a very dark person "täqqwara" (lit. "darkie"). European skin color is regarded as "red" ("oky") - a common African attitude. The concept of "white" coloring connotes paleness ("nätta" (lit. he became pale), undernourishment, sickness, insipid weakness.

822 Color symbolism is followed in dress: The Amhara wear white
291 togas, without coloring more than the border, because the concept white also connotes spiritual purity (by extension of the concept of the absence of physical strength). Yellow ("wäyba") is the traditional color of special mourning, worn only by monastic monks who regard themselves as in a state of perpetual mourning for the passing of Christ from the earth (the dye is made from the bark of the "wayba" tree, hence the name). Green and blue are collectively called "arängwadé", and are not sharply differentiated.

826 Racial ideas also dominate the Amhara concepts of physical

826 beauty: The comparative gerontomorphy of Amhara facial features, even in the case of females, is regarded by them as a mark of beauty, e.g. a long, high bridged nose, which denotes "nobility" and absence of strong negroid strains. In contrast, a flat nose with depressed root and broad nostril is called "kurfäd", which is also used as an insult. The thick lips of the negroid Shanqalla ex-slaves ("känfäräm", lit. full lower lip), especially if at the same time everted ("aheya lämboch" lit. donkey lip; or "lämbocham") are considered marks of ugliness in both men and women. The rare light eyes that crop up among the Amhara are not regarded as special marks of beauty, but as [186] outlandish ("baher ayn", lit. eyes from overseas), for Amhara ethnocentrism is directed also at foreignisms other than negroid traits. [71] The bulging almond eyes popular in other parts of the Middle East are regarded as marks of feminine beauty and feminine "nobility" by the Amhara also.

The spiral peppercorn hair ("barya täcur", lit. slave hair; or "kordada"), of the subjected negroid races is regarded as ugly by the Amhara. Conversely, their own helical hair ("zoma täcur", i.e. hair that stands up thick and rich in a bushy halo, or thick curls) is considered beautiful and indicative of "good racial stock ("attentam"). Outcrops of soft, wavy hair ("lähuçha", light hair that falls down), which is more frequent than light eyes, is regarded as outlandish, but accepted with a smile, as of no great significance.

Similar attitude rules the beauty of the ear. The medium-sized ear of most Amhara is preferred. The round, curved, small negroid ear ("coraf joro") is considered ugly; but the other extreme, the big elongated ear that stands out like a donkey's ("färbaba joro"), found

[826] in many Europeans, is not considered a mark of beauty either.

186 Amhara ethnocentrism rules over their attitudes to the other two
828 major ethnic groups that inhabit Abyssinia: The Coptic Tigrē peoples who are accepted as "ethnic cousins"; and the Muslim and "pagan" Galla, somewhat more African but not negroid, who occupy a middle social position above that of the Shanqalla. The Amhara stereotype as to the personality of these different groups is:

Amhara - "noble", slow of speech, subtle, patient, slow to anger.
Tigrē - shrewd, fast in thought and action, "light" in temper, impatient.
Galla - coarse, shameless (e.g. willing to do manual labor), dull-witted.

An interesting application of this stereotype has arisen in recent years in the discussions about these "national temperaments" by Amhara officers of the modern Ethiopian army, who are concerned with the performance to be expected of the diverse ethnics in battle; important considerations in a country where emotional differences along tribal lines are still strong:

Amhara soldier:

Proud of individual feats; good fighter when his individual pride has been challenged and aroused.

Hates to take orders; difficult to discipline.

Loves to give orders, to act as "great man"; objects to being hurried.

Explosive in temperament, when startled.

Rarely tenaciously energetic; but if he possesses this quality, he is excellent potential leadership material.

"If you treat him as a friend, he thinks he can be your master."

Galla soldier:

Easy to discipline; will take orders and carry them out, without tricks.

186 828 Pride in group, military unit; less emphasis on individual heroism.

Steadier temperament; endurance rather than burst of energy.

"If you treat him as a friend, he will serve you faithfully."

186 779 The religious ethnocentrism of the Amhara is based on their belief that their nation, ruled by the "Solomonic Dynasty", became heir to the "Chosen People" ruled by the House of David, when the latter refused to accept Christ. This is not always clear to the illiterate Amhara, but even he emphasizes this intertwined ethnic and religious principle of his ethnocentrism when he regards the name "Amhara" as signifying both, as he always does.

[304] While the Amhara no longer regards circumcision ("gezrät") as the symbol of entering the Covenant of the Faith, as does the Old Testament and the Jewish religion, he does follow this procedure a week after birth; and an uncircumcised man ("lembut") is called several insulting names and regarded as almost on a level with African Shanqalla slaves who are also uncircumcised. Circumcision therefore has an intertwined ethnic and religious significance.

671 Amhara legal philosophy, guarded by the church, and expressed therefore in the Geez terminology, analyses the universe as follows:

Natural Law - "tabayawi heg"

Man-made Law - (similar to common law) - "sabawi heg"

Moral Law (particularly Coptic law) - "yabaherya heg" (lit. Law from overseas).

186 Ethnocentrism of the Amhara has for several centuries been consciously directed particularly against the attacking Muslims. The "mätäb" neckcord is believed directly the result of one such purposeful development. Numerous proverbs emphasize the stereotype of the Muslim as the breaker of Amhara religious order as well as social order, and the promoter of lawlessness. Even proverbs such as the following,

186 quoted to praise farming as the best and most typical Amhara occupation, casually refer to the Muslim as a person not bound by social ethics:

[539] "He traded - (then he) cheated;
he was appointed (official) - he began (to act) like a Muslim;
(but) he (who) was a farmer - and became a king!"

[177] Nevertheless, the influence of Islam, probably by slow diffusion, has been considerable on Abyssinian Christianity through the centuries. Their avoidance of "unclean, forbidden things" ("erm"), such as pork, though officially based on the Old Testament prohibitions, was probably reawakened or reintroduced and emphasized through the pressure of Muslim ideas, geographically so close.

[532] The Amhara paint an infidel, like any evil person, with one eye, in profile, for "he has only half a soul, is only half-born, sees only half the truth." The outsider is regarded as automatically of evil personality.

C. Amhara Ideas about Body and Personality.

826 Not all Amhara ideas about human beauty are dominated by racial criteria. A long, lean face ("fit s̈älkakka") is considered handsome in a man, while a broad face ("fit n̈eda") is considered ugly; this may bear some relation to the gerontomorphic preference over the pedamorphic.

[304] A long neck ("anḡät") is a mark of beauty, in both sexes, but noted especially in the woman who therefore may have a series of necklaces tattooed on to her neck. The beauty of the long neck is referred to in the following proverb:

[539] "The neck of the dead child
is longer (than ever);
(meaning, "a good thing that came when of no use).

The forehead is considered the location of good fortune, and a large forehead is considered a mark of beauty in men.

152 on the ground, Amhara noblewomen weep silently or go into states
554 of apathy. This is a more common mental ailment among nobles than
158 hysteria, and may lead to chronic depression and even catalepsy (see Part VI).

157 However, both the peasant and the noble share certain common
554 Amhara personality characteristics. Both take great pride in being
186 able to "speak well in court". Homesickness is strong among both, and is very widespread. Kings and emperors, until very recently, had great difficulty in sending and keeping ambassadors abroad, for the diplomat regarded his foreign assignment as "exile". Both classes share great pride in their highland plateau, defended for many centuries against all comers. This national vanity is at least in part due to long ignorance of the world beyond (sometimes hardened into xenophobia); pride in their ancient religion and in the national epics like the Solomon-Sheba-Menelik. These are shared by Amhara of all classes.

829 Amhara concepts of government administration are aristocratic: ruled by the noble "great man", who is usually descended from a feudal warlord of past centuries. The military camp and its direct significance for traditional Amhara social structure and government has been described in Part III. At the top of the hierarchy is the king or emperor (King of Kings). At the Amhara grassroots is the peasant, who seeks justice by attaching himself to a "great man" as retainer, so that he too will be treated "with honor" by reflection. From the bottom to the top of the hierarchy of government, persons on every level perform the ceremony of "dəj tenat" (lit. waiting by the gate) to obtain jobs, maintain positions, or merely to prevent doubts about personal loyalty from arising through absence. This

2: Allen G-5 (1941) 1943 MP5 Amhara MP5

186 The great weakness of the Ethiopians, their inveterate regionalism, arises, like other aspects of their life and history, from the peculiar conditions of their geography. The four historic Kingdoms of Tigrai and Amhara, Shoa and Gojjam, cover the plateaux divided by the canyons of the Blue Nile and [132] the Takkaze and their lateral rifts. During four months of the year, the season of the Great Rains between July and October, Gojjam is entirely cut off from Shoa and Amhara by the floods of the Blue Nile. Only recently has the construction of the bridge over the Blue Nile at Shafartak, a major engineering undertaking, made continuous contact possible. The violent regionalism of the Gojjam has been a disastrous factor in internal Ethiopian history which will doubtless tend to decline with the modern development of communications.

114 The Gojjam, scene of the guerrilla campaign of 1941, has been described by Major Cheesman, formerly H.B.M. Consul in Dangila, in several 175 articles in the Society's *Journal*, and in his standard work on the province, 'Lake Tana and the Blue Nile.' Cheesman's work was in fact the basis of knowledge which made practical the organization of the expedition to reinforce the Patriot groups which were in the field against the Italians at the moment when Italy declared war on Britain. His exploration of the gap up the Escarpment, the fruit of an arduous excursion described in his book, enabled the Frontier Battalion of the Sudan Defence Force with their camel convoys of supplies and arms to make a rapid deployment on to the Escarpment.

175 The least-known part of the Gojjam province is probably the region of the Choké Mountains which rise to the north of Debra Markos. In an effort to [491] hold down this very wild bit of country the Italians had built forts at Mota and other points and a passable dirt road had been constructed linking Debra Markos *via* Mota with Bahrdar—the Italian strong point at the southern tip of Lake Tana. After the capture of Debra Markos in April 1941, it proved necessary to make contact with the small group of Patriots and one company of Sudanese with some British officers and non-commissioned officers who were containing the very considerable Italian force still in the field round the south-east shore of Lake Tana. At Debra Markos we were very short of troops. Further, scarcity of mules made it necessary to try the experiment of taking camels over the pass which runs under the peaks of Choké at an altitude indicated on Italian maps at rather over 13,000 feet. Kit had to be limited to one ground-sheet and one blanket each for all ranks and the plain-bred Sudanese, many of whom were already lame with jiggers, suffered from cold and mountain-sickness particularly in the hail blizzard which struck the force on the bare ridge of the Choké Pass. Nevertheless this one company of Sudanese covered the 70 odd miles in just under three days, and Colonel Boustead bluffed the Italian battalion in Mota into surrender within forty-eight hours of opening fire with his solitary mortar.

I was following along in the rear with the camel *hamlia* and on reaching base camp in front of Mota was met with orders to about turn and take the animals back to Debra Markos. I thus crossed the Choké Mountains twice [114] in one week. With amateur medical and veterinary duties and a driving mist at the higher altitudes alternating with rain, sleet, and hail, I had little opportunity for geographical observation.

11:Levine Z-4,5 (1958-1961)1965 MP5 Amhara MP5

optimum realization of *all* values possible in a given historic situation. He affirms the human values of modernization, yet conceives of modernity not as of a single, fixed nature but as relative to the cultural context in which modernization takes place. Given the commitment to modernization he would sustain traditional values wherever possible; would modify them where feasible; and would reject them where necessary. The chief questions raised from this point of view will be outlined presently, since it is the approach we ourselves shall be following. [121]

All of the intellectual positions just identified have been taken by respectable thinkers. All are to be found among the members of the transitional societies, distributed according to the individual's position in the social structure and, secondarily, according to his psychological makeup. Within the social sciences, moreover, the subject matters of the various disciplines incline them to one or another of these positions. Roughly speaking, one may say that heretofore the anthropologist has tended to take the Traditionalist position; the economist and the Marxist sociologist have been Modernists; the political scientist has leaned toward the Conciliatory position; while sociologists have been oriented as Skeptics and Pragmatists.

THE QUESTIONS OF A PRAGMATIST

Our intention in this book is to analyze a number of aspects of the confrontation between Amhara tradition and Ethiopia's quest for modernity from the viewpoint of a Pragmatist. Three general questions express the main concerns of this viewpoint: (1) What is the nature of the traditional culture, and what are its more enduring beliefs and values? (2) What aspects of modern culture are of interest to the society, and what are the processes by which they are introduced and institutionalized? (3) Given this interest in modernization, in what ways has it been frustrated by certain features of the traditional culture?

These three questions divide the following chapters into three pairs. Chapters ii and iii attempt a sympathetic understanding of some aspects of Amhara culture and an assessment of their positive relevance for Ethiopia in transition. Chapters iv and v deal with aspects of Amhara culture which have been found inadequate for modernization and with the natural processes by which they have been replaced in part by modernizing structures. Chapters vi and vii then explore aspects of the traditional Amhara culture which appear to be obstacles to the realization of the modernist goals. [121] [128]

We shall begin by exploring one of the traditional bases of cultural identity among the Amhara, one of those primordial sentiments whose integrity is a condition of vitality for a traditional people.[11] Vis-à-vis outsiders, the Amhara identify strongly with their religion, language, and racial characteristics, though not so fanatically as to preclude their toleration of other groups as [186]

11:Levine Z-4,5 (1958-1961)1965 MP5 Amhara MP5

121 128 [186] part of a common nationality. Among themselves, however, the Amhara place great stress on region of origin. Deeply sentimental about their homelands, they regard those whose families have long dwelt in the same area almost as kinsmen vis-à-vis Amhara from other regions. In chapter ii, two of these areas which hold a special place in Ethiopian history are explored in some detail. The history, ethos, and cultural significance of Manz and Gondar are discussed, partly to provide an introduction to Amhara culture that has some historical depth, and partly as background to the general question of the place of primordial sentiments like regionalism in a modernizing society.

Chapter iii proceeds to examine the matrix of Amhara culture, the world of the peasant. Its rhetorical aim is chiefly to bring the little-known peasant into sharper focus, to reaffirm the peasant world as one worthy of attention and respect. This will be done, first, by describing the social setting of peasant life, and the main events which make up the daily round and annual cycle of the typical Amhara. Then we shall explore the world view of the Amhara peasant, the main ideas and attitudes through which he interprets his experience. In conclusion, we shall discuss the relation of some aspects of this world view to certain aspects of modern culture.

Chapter iv proceeds from the fact that the skills and values needed for effective participation in a modernizing society cannot be imparted by the traditional processes of socialization during adolescence. With the establishment of a government school system a new and separate pattern has come into being that exists largely, though not wholly, in isolation from the traditional agents and mechanisms of secondary socialization. The subject of this chapter is thus the contrasting conditions in which an Amhara youth is brought up in the traditional and modernizing sectors of Ethiopian society. This account is followed by a portrayal of the outlook of Ethiopian students today, with emphasis on the question of the continuity and discontinuity of their beliefs, tastes, and values with those of traditional Amhara culture.

In chapter v our attention shifts to the elite structure of Amhara-Tigre society. In this sphere modernization has proceeded, not by the addition of a novel structure as in the case of secondary socialization during adolescence, but through a process of differentiation within the existing order and deliberate co-ordination by the sovereign. We shall discuss, first, the traditional elites of monarchy, nobility, and clergy; and then the changes in the status of these elites and the emergence of the new elites of government officials and a modern-educated "intelligentsia."

A key question to emerge from this chapter concerns what appears to be the relative ineffectuality and passivity of the modernizing intelligentsia as a whole. This is a complex and difficult question, only partly to be explained by the political conditions which are referred to in the chapter. We shall sug-

11:Levine Z-4,5 (1958-1961)1965 MP5 Amhara MP5

Perhaps this sort of disposition was not unrelated to the part Manz played in sparking the restoration of Amhara rule in Shoa, thereby preparing the way for the dramatic resurgence and expansion of the Ethiopian state at the end of the nineteenth century.

The Gondarē Ethos

The unique character of Gondar derives first of all from the fact that it was a city. During the whole period of Ethiopian history reviewed in this chapter, the Gondar period was the only time in which the emperors resided in a fixed capital, and Gondar was the only permanent population center that grew beyond the contours of a large village. As in ancient Egypt before the rise of Thebes, the concept of the city had played scarcely any role in the political thinking of the Amhara, and so anomalous was the rise of Gondar that Ludolphus, writing in the fifth decade after the founding of Gondar, could not believe stories that Gondar was a large city and predicted that "perhaps in a few years there will be nothing to be seen of it."[38]

Like many oriental cities, Gondar consisted more of a collection of small homogeneous societies than of a diffused heterogeneous urban population. The city was divided into several quarters, each of which lived its own life. The imperial compound was of course foremost of these. It contained the great complex of buildings erected during more than a hundred years, from Fāsil to Iyāsu II, and was the seat of affairs of state. The compound was separated from the rest of the city by a stone wall, whose twelve well-guarded gates each served a special function or class of people.[39]

The nobility resided in a quarter known as Gaing Bēt. Here the dwellings were spaced at comfortable distances, and nearly every house was surrounded by a garden. Abyssinians of lower rank lived in the more densely populated sections of Faras Bēt and Denkākē.

The Christian hierarchy had its own quarters. The *abuna,* an Egyptian monk appointed by the Coptic Patriarch at Alexandria as spiritual head of the Ethiopian Church, lived with his retinue in one sector.[40] Another area, Eçhagē Bēt, was reserved for the Amhara monk who served as administrative head of the Church. Each church compound, moreover, was the focus of another residential section, where its clergy kept their modest huts. The Eçhage Bēt and the church compounds were considered sanctuaries and thus, in theory at least, were secure from plunderers. The Gondarēs and wealthy people from the country used these areas as a safety vault for their valuables.

The ethnic groups which settled in Gondar had their respective ghettos. The Muslims lived in the lower part of the city adjacent to the river Qīha, which was convenient for their ritual ablutions. They were looked down on by the Christians, and meat slaughtered by one group would not be touched by the other. Poncet observed that when an Abyssinian met a Muslim in the

11:Levine Z-4,5 (1958-1961)1965 MP5 Amhara MP5

streets, "he salutes him with his left hand, which is a mark of contempt."[41] The Falasha, potters and metalsmiths of Judaic faith, were similarly segregated, and plied their arts and crafts in another quarter.

Though many different peoples came together in Gondar, and though it was a meeting-point of trade routes from the Sudan, the Red Sea ports, and the African interior, Gondar's cultural role was not primarily that of a melting pot of diverse traditions. It served rather as an agent for the quickened development of the Amhara's own culture.[42] And thus it became a focus of national pride. The countryfolk looked on Gondar not as a hotbed of alien custom and immorality, as they often regard Addis Ababa today, but as the most perfect and advanced embodiment of their own traditional values.

The Gondarē himself, as denizen of this second Jerusalem, was prouder still. A snobbish pride became one of the conspicuous marks of Gondarē character. This pride is manifest in many ways. On the one hand, it appears as incorrigible vanity. Hence arise the many caricatures of the Gondarē—as one who goes hungry in order to purchase fine clothes in which to strut about, or as one who satisfied his hunger at home before going out in order not to appear needy at his host's table. (Perhaps the most famous of the stories about the Gondarē is the one about the man who spent the night naked and shivering because, for form's sake, he hung up his only garment as a curtain about himself.) On the other hand, Gondarē pride appears as the immense dignity with which the Gondarē carries himself, his sensitivity to the nuances of personal relations, his choice use of the Amharic language, his noble bearing. If there is a polarity in Gondarē life comparable to the Manzē polarity of bravery versus aggression, it is pride versus vanity.

Gondar's role as political and cultural capital of the nation for so long produced two other distinctive aspects of the Gondarē ethos. One is the love of *shumat,* or political appointments. Despite the unfortunate denouement of the Gondar monarchy, Gondar's importance as chief administrative center for such a long period had a deep influence on the ways of the people. "Give the Gondarē any office whatsoever," it is said, "and no matter what the salary, he will be happy."

The Gondarē's love of *shumat* is expressed in two phenomena which contrast strikingly with their Manzē counterparts. In the naming of children, the Gondarē prefers names which express an ambition for political honors, such as *Makonnen,* meaning "nobleman," and *Negusē* ("my king"). Furthermore, litigation in Gondar is characteristically concerned with disputes regarding *mādariyā,* land which has been given as an award for service to the government, as well as with disputes over *rĭst.*

The other prominent aspect of Gondar's ethos relates to its position as the center of Ethiopia's Christian literati. The fact that it was the ecclesiastical capital of the country is not the most important consideration here. Of course,

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tical character of Gondar has been implanted deeply enough so that one young Gondarē, commenting on the absence of dance halls such as are found in other Ethiopian cities, remarked: "This place is one big monastery."

In accord with Haile Selassie's program of centralization, the chief provincial administrators in Gondar are not local men. This has created a subtle problem for the national government. The Gondarēs cannot forget that their city was the capital of Ethiopia for more than two hundred years. They view the Shoans as political upstarts and love to refer to the Shoan Amhara as "Galla." As a result, Shoans in high offices at Gondar have found themselves boycotted by the natives. Their wishes have frequently been ignored by local subordinates or the local populace. They have not been invited to take part in the social life of the Gondarēs. All this has made the lot of Shoan emissaries in Gondar frustrating and lonely.

In order to increase the Gondarē's identification with the national government, its representatives in Gondar have tried in various ways to assert the symbolic supremacy of Addis Ababa. The traditional site for celebrating the festival of Masqal—the great sycamore near Fāsil's castle—has been shifted to the modern Haile Selassie I Square. An imposing sculpture is to be placed over the tomb of Nagāssi, and a principal street in Gondar has been named after him. Plans are afoot to outshine the traditional marketplace with one enhanced by modern facilities, to be named Haile Selassie I Market.

Despite the evident satisfaction with which one Shoan administrator noted that "the Gondarēs are not so proud any more," even for Shoa's purposes the traditional prestige of Gondar cannot be completely eradicated. The government gains much profit by extolling Ethiopia's long history. The flight to Gondar has become a standard part of the itinerary for foreign dignitaries. Gondar remains, after the stelae of Aksum and the monoliths of Lalibela, the most impressive visible reminder of the Ethiopian past.

Manz Today

The accession of the House of Manz to the throne of Ethiopia has given Manz much prestige in the national capital. Because Menelik and his successors filled the government with people from their home area, numerous higher officials of the imperial Ethiopian government are also of Manzē origin. Partly for these reasons, partly because of their scanty knowledge of Ethiopian geography, many Ethiopians born and raised in Addis Ababa claim to be of Manzē ancestry, even though their families may in fact have come from Merhābētē or Bulgā or other parts of Shoa.

Due to the close tie between the present imperial family and the homeland of Manz, a special affection persists between Haile Selassie and the Manzēs. The latter are said to have a standing invitation at the palace, including the

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643 571 right to a direct audience at any time. The Emperor is known to glow with pleasure when a subject with whom he is speaking reveals that he comes from Manz. The Manzēs, for their part, proudly refer to their area as *ya-negus agar* ("king's country"). They are perhaps the most devoted of all Ethiopians to the present Crown. However, many stories are told to show that this loyalty has not dissolved their intractable spirit. For example, when asked to select a representative for Ethiopia's first elected parliament in 1957, some of them were indignant: "We already have *our* representative in the capital, and if he isn't able to do the job himself, let him step down and hand it to somebody else."

871 658 Despite their expressed loyalty to Haile Selassie, the Manzēs stubbornly oppose the program with which he is publicly most associated and whose portfolio he has retained, as Minister of Education, from 1943 to the present day. The adults of Manz object to having their children attend the government schools. In many cases where a child has elected to attend school on his own, his parents have cut off all support. The four schools in Manz thus have [162] an enrolment far below capacity, totaling (as of 1960) less than four hundred in this area of perhaps fifty to sixty thousand families.[49] Those hardy youngsters who do attend school often do so in rags and with an empty stomach.

[857] One reason for this determined opposition to the government schools is the obvious economic one: children must stay at home to tend the herds. This is a problem all over rural Ethiopia, but still the schools in many other areas are overcrowded. Another reason is that, as we have seen, Manz was not interested in education in the old days. Few Manzēs learned to read in the church schools. When a boy showed unusual talent and interest in traditional studies he had to travel to Gondar, which often meant running away from Manz.

871 658 186 829 The crux of Manzē defiance of the new educational system, however, is cultural fundamentalism. The Manzēs keep their children away from the government schools because they fear that the students there are learning something that threatens the old ways. In particular, they do not like their children to learn the language of the *faranj* ("European") or to be exposed to Ethiopians who have been taught by *faranj* and thereby infected by alien ideas. Tending the farm, keeping the fasts, defending land and self—that is the sum and substance of Manzē education, beyond which there is nothing a boy needs to learn.

829 648 186 Undoubtedly part of this dread of *faranj* learning is based on the Manzēs' one experience with the white man: the Fascist occupation. As one of the strongholds of patriotic resistance to the occupation, Manz and the Manzēs became the object of the invader's unyielding fury. Over miles and miles of Manz not a home or church was spared. The inhabitants were either killed, or fled to safer areas in Galla country, or joined the underground opposition—

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in such numbers that "Manzē" virtually became a synonym for "underground patriot."

After the liberation, as after the routing of Ahmad Grāñ's forces, the Manzē once again returned to redeem a ravished land. Slowly, the houses were rebuilt, the land was plowed once more. Churches which had been rebuilt after Grāñ's destruction only to be razed by the Italians were again put into place. Tough in his spiritual as in his physical life, the Manzē doggedly re-established the culture of his own. Now as before the occupation, a man of Manz sits on the throne, promising to let no foreigner take his country's land,* while the young braves celebrate the royal line in their festive boasting:

Ya-Manz ababā, ya-Manz ababā! Yābbabāl genā!
The flower of Manz, the flower of Manz! It will bloom yet again!

The Legacy of Manz and Gondar

Thus far the significance of Manz and Gondar has been discussed from the point of view of an outsider. We have attempted to assess, on the basis of the best available evidence, the respective historical and cultural roles of these two noted Amhara regions. We turn now to a different though related question, namely, the significance of these two places in the minds and feelings of Ethiopians themselves.

Two kinds of reaction are conspicuous. To the Ethiopian Modernist, Manz and Gondar are seen primarily as outlying pockets of conservatism. Their commitments to the past move them to resist certain changes promoted by the national government, with Manz protesting modern education and Gondar defending itself against nationalist centralization. They are regarded as backward areas, representative of the many forces that are "holding Ethiopia back," and to a certain extent are disdained.

To their inhabitants, on the other hand, these places are objects of intense loyalty. For differences of identity among the Amhara are defined chiefly in terms of their *agar*, or "home country." The size of one's *agar* is relative; it depends on the context in which the symbol is used, and may be as small as a district or as large as a province. Whatever the referent, one's *agar* signifies more than a place of residence or provenience. It means "home," and all those whose families live there are regarded with special affection, while those out-

* On certain festive occasions the following antiphonal chant is declaimed in praise of "Ṭaqel" (the affectionate, "horse" name of Haile Selassie):

[Leader:] *Mīn āla ṭaqel mīn āla?*
[Chorus:] *Agarē la-saw agarē la-saw alaṭem ala!*
[Leader:] What did Ṭaqel say, what did he say?
[Chorus:] "My country to outsiders, my country to outsiders, I will not give!" said he.

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side are regarded with reserve and suspicion, if not hostility. For this reason the word of native local authorities has always carried more weight than that of imported or distant authorities. For this reason the names of bars and cafés around Addis Ababa today are to a large extent place names. For this reason the type of voluntary association which has aroused the most enthusiastic interest in Addis Ababa in recent years is the association based on a membership drawn from the same *agar*.[50] Regionalist sentiments are so intense in connection with these groups that some members of the Manz association, for example, have asserted that they would not admit to membership a person whose family originated in a district only a few kilometers outside the boundaries of Manz.

This type of orientation to Manz, Gondar, and the many other regions in Amhara country may be regarded as an instance of the more general phenomenon referred to above as "primordial sentiments." These are sentiments which are based on the awareness of certain given qualities shared by the members of a group, qualities such as race, language, religious affiliation, tribal affiliation, as well as region of origin. The primordial sentiments account for much of the cohesion and much of the vitality among the members of any traditional society. How these allegiances are affected in the course of modernization has considerable bearing on the future shape of the rapidly developing nations.

A number of factors inherent in modernization work to erode the primordial sentiments. Increased physical and social mobility tend to uproot the individual from the settings of family and home community in which these sentiments are produced and reinforced. Occupational position comes to replace membership in primordial groups as a primary determinant of status and identity. Secondary education, military training, and the development of national institutions and symbols promote the sentiment of nationalism to which these narrower allegiances are subordinated.

Other aspects of modernization, however, work in the opposite direction to intensify primordial sentiments. The education of members of minority groups gives them both a heightened sense of grievance and a voice with which to protest. The creation of new forms of wealth and power provides new bases for competition and conflict, processes which tend to be structured along lines already laid out by cleavages based on primordial differences. The insecurity aroused by the threat to tradition inherent in modernization also produces defensive reactions which often take the form of heightened allegiance to such groups.

This intensification of primordial loyalties during modernization presents a problem which, for all their differences, nearly all the nations of Africa and Asia have in common. Whether the critical differences revolve about language, as in India; religion, as in Lebanon; geography, as in Indonesia; or

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referents are relative: a man living at 7,500 feet may be considered *qolaññā* by one living at 10,000 and *dēgaññā* by one living at 6,000 feet.

The broadest membership circle that the Amhara peasant normally thinks in terms of is that of the ethnic group consisting of all Amhara.[10] The ethnic self-conception of the Amhara is one which stresses certain physical and cultural characteristics, thanks to which he regards himself as superior to all non-Abyssinian groups in Ethiopia as well as to all non-Ethiopian nationals. With regard to race, the Amhara consider themselves distinctly more handsome than both the white man and the Negro man, to both of whom they apply derisive epithets. Their cultural identity is defined chiefly with respect to religion and language.

To all Amhara except a small minority who are Muslim, the name of their ethnic group is synonymous with "Christian." The term signifies Ethiopian Orthodox Christian; for the Amhara peasant, "Catholic" and "Protestant" are equivalent to "Muslim" and "pagan" as terms designating so many kinds of heathens. And being an Ethiopian Christian is to the Amhara a mark of superiority in at least two respects: it means belonging to a chosen people, heirs to the Jews and sole bearers of authentic Christianity; and it means being an adept in praying and fasting, which to the Amhara are peculiarly Abyssinian arts. This orientation has motivated a certain amount of exclusionism vis-à-vis non-Christian Ethiopians. The latter are disdained because they are not Christian, while at the same time the particularistic cast of Abyssinian Christianity has made the Amhara somewhat reluctant to proselytize and admit non-Abyssinians to the fold. A similar exclusiveness colors the Amhara's sentiments about his language. Knowledge of Amharic is considered another index of superiority, and the Amhara look down on Ethiopians who do not speak Amharic or who speak it with an accent.

The Amhara claim superiority over other Ethiopian peoples in connection with certain other aspects of culture besides religion and language, although most Amhara peasants have very little knowledge about the other ethnic groups in the country.[11] Occupational hunters and pastoral nomads are ridiculed, for example, because of their ignorance of the arts of farming and of eating *ǐnjarā*. Vis-à-vis Europeans, on the other hand, the Amhara's self-image tends to stress qualities of bravery and toughness. Insofar as he has had contact with foreigners, the Amhara has become self-conscious about his rugged way of life—his hot foods, endurance on trips, courage in revenge, and virile longevity—and looks down on the softness of the European.

Being an Amhara is thus belonging to a superior category of human beings. This is not simple ethnocentrism; it reflects rather a basically aristocratic orientation that is repeated within the Amhara fold. It is not only members of other ethnic and religious groups who are considered inferior,

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but also various categories of Amhara discriminated on the basis of sex, age, and social position.

Although Amhara women enjoy considerable property and inheritance rights, their generally depressed status reflects the low opinion commonly held of them. The peasant woman's lot is as hard as that of a slave. In the wealthier families, where domestic drudgery is relieved by servants, she must still be a passive, reserved nonentity. Women are beaten as a matter of course for mistakes in their work or apparent flirtations with other men. As the proverb says: "Women and donkeys need the stick." "Woman's work" is referred to derisively by men; "woman's language" is the epithet for vulgar and trivial talk.

A common justification for keeping women at home nearly all the time is that if they are allowed to go outside they will stir up all manner of trouble, for by nature they are gossipers and deceivers. Another proverb tells us: "Mules and women will betray you." In a number of legends, including those connected with the saintly figures of Eṭhē Yohānnes and Takla Hāymānot, women have been turned to stone because of their vile tongues and treacherous ways. Menstruation is viewed as the punishment incurred by womankind as a result of that first great treachery in Eden.

Children are considered inferior because they are governed by ignorance and passion. Toward infants the Amhara is lenient. Because "infants and cattle are the same," tiny children are not expected to perform reasonably. After two or three years, during which time the child has been indulged copiously by the father as well as the mother, his status begins to drop. He comes to be looked on as a servant. By about six years he has passed the first "age of reason," but he is wise enough only to stay away from fire, the edges of cliffs, and prickly plants. For most of his actions he must be given orders.

As the child grows older he is supposed to be dominated in turn by each of the four elements. The adolescent is likened to air: flighty, never settled. The young man is like fire: hot in picking quarrels as he is hot chasing after women, and altogether not worth very much. Only as a man approaches forty does he begin to gain respectability. He becomes cool, like water. This is a time when he minds his own business, does his work properly, and is not so prone to go about insulting others. This is the advent of the real age of reason, when a person arrives at an understanding of what is right and wrong in life. Most esteemed of all is the elder, the man of sixty or seventy. Like earth, he is settled and stable. He is sober, wise, indifferent to insults, pious, and ready to mediate rather than take part in quarrels. Children soon learn that older folk, not themselves, are the hope of the earth. This lesson was conveyed by the little boy who, when asked what he wanted to become when he grew up, replied: "I want to become an elder."

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New Agents of Socialization

In Amhara society, as we have seen, the agents of primary socialization—parents and older relatives—likewise prepare the young person for adulthood, by teaching him work skills, arranging his marriage, and conditioning him to the mores of adult society. In changing Ethiopia, these traditional managers of adolescence are unable to impart the skills and values needed for a modern life. Their role as agents of secondary socialization is taken for the most part by teachers and peers in the government schools.

Schools at the post-elementary levels in Ethiopia have been staffed mainly by teachers brought under contract from foreign countries—chiefly Canada, England, India, Sweden, and the United States. Together with a growing number of Ethiopians who have studied abroad, and some graduates of Ethiopian colleges, these teachers have been the principal medium through which Ethiopian adolescents have been exposed to Western culture, not only by teaching subjects like science and English literature, and skills like drafting and stenography, but also by imparting attitudes and values important for Ethiopia's modernization.

High among these new values is that of rewarding an individual solely on the basis of performance. Although the long arm of "connections" has occasionally reached into the school system, to save, for example, the relative of some dignitary from dismissal despite substandard performance, the day-to-day operation of school life follows general standards which are applied without regard to family connections, class position, or tribal and religious affiliations.* The degree to which the students have accepted the sovereignty of universal norms is reflected in their response to the question: "In general, what will help you most to get ahead, ability or 'pull' (that is, personal contacts or influence, through family or friends)?" Nine-tenths of the students at both secondary and college levels expressed the belief that ability would help them more to get ahead.

Another modern value promoted by the school staffs is that of Ethiopian nationalism. In the elementary schools outside of Addis Ababa, pupils tend to associate chiefly with members of their own tribe and religion. In the post-elementary schools, they inevitably have considerable intercourse with members of other groups. On the basis of our sample, the ethnic composition of the post-elementary schools may be estimated as in Table 2. This ethnic pluralism would seem at first to intensify particularistic sentiments among

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 115]

* This reflects deliberate government policy. Before the occupation, sons of noblemen were segregated at Tafari Makonnen School and received preferential treatment. After the liberation, the Emperor not only discontinued this policy but took pains to eliminate favoritism in the schools to a large degree.

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the students. Rivalries and hostilities tend to get channeled along these lines, particularly along the Amhara-Tigre axis, and petty fights have erupted from time to time among groups of students so divided. The Amhara students, moreover, tend to interpret their numerical majority in school as self-evident justification of their political superiority in the country, an interpretation sullenly rejected by non-Amhara students who tend to be more aware of the Amhara's much smaller percentage of the national population. However, the students are regarded by their teachers, not as members of tribes, but as Ethiopians. The school authorities thus act as a countervailing force in behalf of national symbols, and their effect is considerable.[14] While entering students naturally tend to identify in the first instance with their tribes, sixty per cent of the secondary school seniors and seventy-five per cent of the college students questioned about political identifications indicated that they considered themselves Ethiopians before they considered themselves members of tribes.

The teachers also provide practical information of various sorts to assist the acculturation of their charges. They teach the etiquette of modernity, including the importance of punctuality and the keeping of promises. The objects and events in their own lives quietly demonstrate to the students much about modern Western culture, while their use of English in and out of class accustoms the students to the use of their country's official European language. Thus, besides promoting respect for impersonal standards and the sense of Ethiopian nationalism, the teachers fulfill a third extracurricular function of some importance: that of making the schools a vehicle for social mobility, a place to acquire that minimum of European habits which is essential for attaining high status in a modernizing society.

The total accomplishment of the teachers, however, falls short of giving the modern adolescents a coherent orientation to life. The cultural lessons they transmit are neither consistent among the various schools nor closely related to the situation of changing Ethiopia. The organization of education, as of everything else in Ethiopia, reflects the abiding anxiety of the government about permitting any one foreign nation to gain a monopoly in any sphere of activity. Each secondary school and college has heretofore been virtually autonomous, pursuing those policies and teaching those lessons which best fit its point of view, a point of view now guided by British culture, now by American, now by Swedish, now by French, now by Jesuit. As Margery Perham long since observed, this created a situation in which Ethiopian students have gotten "fragments from the experience and ideals of each [nation] without getting the fullest and best influence from any one national tradition."[15]

Another shortcoming of the educational program has been the relative paucity of materials relating to Ethiopian realities. As one Ethiopian educator has written: "School children are at times more familiar with the history of

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In these attitudes one may note the persistence of such traditional valuations as the esteem for power, the stress on religion, and the concern about polite and dignified behavior, alongside such modernist valuations as the esteem for civilization (*seltānē*) and science. With regard to the emerging world power of Africa, however, the students have been rapidly coming to reject the traditional Abyssinian viewpoint, which looks with disdain upon the Negroid peoples of Africa as racially and culturally inferior.

As recently as a decade ago, a group of Ethiopian college students responded with ridicule and evident disdain to an illustrated ethnographic account of some East African tribes. But in the late 1950's, due to the growing

TABLE 13

ATTITUDES OF ETHIOPIAN STUDENTS TOWARD THE "BIG THREE" POWERS

Classification of Comments	England (per cent)	U.S.A. (per cent)	U.S.S.R. (per cent)
Positive.....	32	59	47
Negative.....	37	19	26
Neutral.....	11	5	6
No answer....	20	17	21
Number..	(640)	(700)	(662)

prominence of the African independence movement and the decision of the Ethiopian government to take more interest in African affairs, the pan-African sentiment began to invade the heretofore aloof highland plateau of Ethiopia. The attendance in Ethiopian colleges of students from other African countries and the growing number of pan-African meetings in Addis Ababa have promoted this trend. Consequently a number of Ethiopian students now follow with growing interest the developments in other African countries, and not a few indicated that their identification with Africa as a whole was stronger than their identification with Ethiopia. All but 8 per cent of the 700 students questioned: "What do you think about Africa?" had some response that showed concern, whether sympathy for African independence and getting rid of the Europeans (28 per cent), or sensitivity about Africa's "undeveloped" and "uncivilized" state and its need to work hard (33 per cent), or pride and confidence in Africa's resources and future (24 per cent).

So deeply rooted a sentiment as prejudice against Negroid Africans cannot quickly be willed away. It does seem, however, that the emergence of the

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new African nations is proving to be an effective agency for reducing such prejudices among the students. The broader political identity afforded by pan-Africanism may in turn be promoting a more genuine national feeling among the younger educated Ethiopians, a feeling of solidarity that begins to encompass all the ethnic groups in their land.

Still another sphere in which the Ethiopian students have had some room for the development of political values has been the study of history. The students were therefore asked to name the persons in Ethiopian and in world history whom they most liked and disliked, and to explain why.

The three most liked figures in Ethiopian history were Haile Selassie, mentioned by 36 per cent of the respondents; Tēwodros (30 per cent); and Menelik (16 per cent). Named much less frequently were Yohānnes (mostly by Tigre students); military heroes of Menelik's day, and of the resistance during the Italian occupation; and church figures, especially Abuna Peṭros (the great Orthodox martyr of the occupation).

The reasons given for naming Haile Selassie include the wide variety of respects for which his reign has been praised. He is liked for uniting Ethiopia, supporting education, fighting for the country's freedom, introducing modern civilization, and generally "helping the country." The reasons given extend to expressions of very personal attachment, such as "he gives me education," "he supplies everything," and "he is my guardian."

The reasons given for liking Tēwodros or Menelik best are more circumscribed, and they are balanced by a number of other responses in which these two emperors are named as the most *disliked* persons in Ethiopian history (Tēwodros, 7 per cent; Menelik, 4 per cent). Tēwodros is liked chiefly because of his bravery and his attempt to unite the nation, while he is disliked because of his cruelty. Menelik is liked chiefly because of his defense of the country at Adowa and his efforts to modernize Ethiopia and introduce education; and he is disliked for having sold parts of the country to Europeans. Yohānnes is mentioned about the same number of times in both categories (2 per cent): positively, for his courage in battle and his Christian zeal and, negatively, for his intolerance in persecuting non-Christians.

Līj Iyāsu (11 per cent) and Ahmad Grāñ (8 per cent) are the most disliked figures in Ethiopian history. They are associated with specific offenses: Iyāsu with being an "incompetent ruler," "encouraging Islam," and "chasing after women," and Grāñ with burning churches and massacring Christians. Three other persons in this category are Sultan Ibrahim (5 per cent), for selling the port of Assab; Dajāzmātch Haile Selassie Gugsa (4 per cent), for fighting on the side of the Italians in 1935; and Yodit (2 per cent), the legendary queen who is said to have sacked Aksum in the tenth century.

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cation. Since the mechanism of stratification ranks all the members of a society according to the value placed on their qualities and performances by that society, the stratification system of a society is its most inclusive framework of social order. Here too, however, conflicting value orientations are embodied in more or less distinct status hierarchies, and it is no longer possible to find status evaluations which are shared throughout the society. It is in the composition and relations of the elites that the value conflicts in Ethiopia today are most explicit, and in their mutual adjustments that the movement toward new forms of integration is most likely to be manifest.

The traditional infrastructure of Abyssinian society was itself relatively stratified. Highest in status were the landowning peasants, the older and wealthier of whom merged imperceptibly into the lower stratum of the nobility. Next in order were the peasants of various situations who did not own land: sons waiting to inherit land from their parents, tenants paying rents in kind to some landlord, and agricultural laborers attached as retainers on the estates of wealthy peasants, nobles, or churches. Below them were the statuses of Abyssinians who led a more mobile sort of existence, such as weavers, minstrels, common soldiers, and beggars.

The trading class was broadly divided into two ranks, that of the merchant (*naggādē*) whose caravans brought goods from afar, and that of the small-scale peddler (*shaqātch*). The wealthier Abyssinian merchant was accorded very high status, comparable at times to that of the nobility. If an Arab, Armenian, or Muslim Abyssinian, however, his status would be tainted by that disesteem felt for all outside the ethnic pale. The peddlers as a class were in a low status, comparable to that of the weavers and minstrels. Below these were metalsmiths, potters, and tanners, who were sometimes low caste Abyssinian artisans, sometimes Falasha or Gurage tribesmen. Lowest in status were the slaves, captured in wars or raiding expeditions from the Negroid tribes in the west (Shanqalla) and north (Baria and Kunama), and from the Kaffa and other Cushitic groups in the south. Freed for a generation now, such people still work as household servants and retainers, or as laborers in the towns.

Such were the classes which performed the drudgery. They produced sufficient surplus to sustain a fairly extensive, if not opulent, leisure class, which ministered to the more general political and cultural needs of the society. The feudal nobility and the clergy represented the paramount values of warfare and religion and shared responsibility for the maintenance of legal order. Together with the emperor, to whom they were normally subordinate, they commanded the resources and respect of the Abyssinian people and set standards for their behavior.

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India (10 per cent); and by international organizations, chiefly WHO and ICAO (8 per cent). The others were financed privately, either by their families (8 per cent), or, in a few cases (3 per cent), by religious groups or business firms.

Given this variety of educational background, it is not surprising that the experience of study abroad has had a variable effect on the returnees. Their images of modernity are differently colored according to the country where they have received their higher education. Their archetypes for the modern component of language vary according to the language in which they have received their technical training.

Despite such variety—which may ultimately serve to enrich their cultural life more than to fragment it—several effects of the experience abroad appear common to nearly all the returnees. These include a radical broadening of perspective; the taste for a high standard of living; greater appreciation of political freedom; a heightened sense of Ethiopian identity; and an increase in nationalistic sentiment.

Because Ethiopian students are highly motivated to learn what goes on about them in foreign countries, their travel abroad has tended to broaden their outlooks rather than to confirm their prejudices. This expansion of perspective alters their attitude toward Ethiopia in two different ways. On the one hand, by enabling them to evaluate aspects of Ethiopian life they had previously taken for granted, it has made them more aggressively critical about conditions at home. On the other hand, it has given them a greater sense of pride about Ethiopia. They have noticed that, however advanced their host country, it had certain shortcomings of its own, a sort of observation which has tended to ease the sting of cultural inferiority inevitably felt during the stay in a more modernized society.

> Before going to the United States, I pictured it as the most perfect country on earth. We students in Ethiopia believed that everything good and beautiful comes from America. After studying there, I was disappointed in many ways. For example, I found the Americans to be hypocritical—they go to church, and don't care about religion; they talk about tolerance, and are still quite prejudiced. This was a great lesson for me. I can never be so romantic about a foreign country again, and can appreciate Ethiopia's strengths as well as its weaknesses better now.

Short travel tours sometimes had a similar effect:

> I spent several weeks in Yugoslavia. . . . And I must say—despite how backward we are here, we live much more happily than the Yugoslavs. The people themselves are wonderful—warm and generous; but their lives are miserable. That experience was really quite a surprise for me.

No matter what its shortcomings, the host country inevitably accustomed Ethiopians abroad to a higher standard of living than they had known at

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home—except for the difficulty of having to do without servants. Those students whose rural background and limited intellectual experience had led them to consider Addis Ababa as one of the most advanced cities in the world were often shocked by the comparison. No less shocking was the moral climate, which permitted one to express oneself freely and honestly. The taste for intellectual freedom was added to that of political freedom, as students whose horizons were limited by the meager intellectual fare at home came into hungry contact with authors like Marx and Freud, Dewey and Russell.

However much the Ethiopian students abroad might seek to lose themselves in the host culture, they were not permitted to do so. In the mirror of foreigners' regards, their identity as Ethiopians took clearer shape, transcending narrower tribal identifications. Questions about Ethiopia by foreigners aroused greater interest in Ethiopia's history and contemporary problems. A number of students were thus moved to dip into the literature on their country produced by travelers and scholars in the past, and some of them came to write theses and dissertations on problems related to Ethiopia's development.

All of these factors—broadening of perspective, acquaintance with a higher economic standard, less inhibited discussions, and greater self-consciousness as Ethiopians—contributed to a spirit of nationalist dedication. This spirit was confirmed or aroused in all but two groups of the returnees. One, consisting of children of some wealthy members of the new nobility, went abroad chiefly for the prestige and pleasure involved. For them the experience was an extended holiday; they were playboys more than students. The other group consists of those who were abroad for too short a time to have a complete educational experience—in some cases, for as little as three months. These students have tended to use the tour abroad chiefly as a weapon with which to lord it over their peers on return and otherwise to serve narrow personal ambitions. Those students, however, for whom study abroad entailed a more or less serious encounter with higher education and a more modernized culture normally experienced a swelling aspiration to serve their country. They returned home deeply critical of the status quo and determined to contribute substantially to the modernization of their society.

Ostensibly, the returnees have been well situated for making such a contribution. Thanks to prudent government policy since the early fifties, they have been enabled to enjoy a minimally comfortable standard of living. Given a monthly allowance from the moment they step off the plane, they have been automatically salaried at a scale based largely on the academic degree attained, with A.B.'s starting at Eth$450 a month and Ph.D.'s at Eth$700. In addition, provisions have been made for them to borrow money from the government in order to finance heavy investments like furniture or, more usually, an automobile.

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ly meticulous about the state of their clothes. They have their shoes shined several times daily, even when they are eating only one solid meal per day. They are intent on receiving the proper deference—for example, on being served properly in a hotel. This concern for status is projected in the form of an intense nationalism that considers the speedy displacement of non-Ethiopians holding important jobs in the country a more urgent need than the establishment of effective modern institutions and universalistic standards.

Some locals can be found, of course, whose problems and aspirations resemble those of the returnees, and vice versa. However, the characteristics here associated with the two types follow logically from their basic situation and have been observed sufficiently to justify this depicting of them in terms of ideal types. The distinction is further justified on the grounds that the two groups have developed a modicum of corporate identity and a degree of mutual antagonism which was particularly pronounced in the mid-fifties.

The returnees were at first inclined to regard their locally educated countrymen with snobbish pride because of the keen sense of superiority which study abroad conferred. It was natural, moreover, for the returnees to associate most closely with those who had shared the very important personal experience of living abroad, and so they tended to neglect their former schoolmates who never crossed the seas. At times, in fact, they scarcely bothered to exchange greetings with them.

The sense that they were being regarded as inferiors embittered the locals. At the same time they were jealous that they, too, had not had the opportunity to study abroad. These mutual incriminations were heightened by economic competition, the returnees claiming that those who stayed behind had the advantage of working their way up into significant and lucrative positions, the locals believing that a degree from abroad was an automatic entree to a good job.

The latent antagonism between locals and returnees came to a head in 1957, with the simultaneous publication in the *Voice of Ethiopia* of an article by a local criticizing returnee behavior[61] and the presentation of a play by the National Patriotic Association which caricatured them. The play, for example, showed a returnee entering the office of a minister, patting him on the back, puffing cigarette smoke into his eyes, sitting back with his feet up on the minister's desk and talking on and on disrespectfully. Another returnee was shown failing to recognize his own mother when she comes into his office, exclaiming: "Woman, get out of here!" A small group of returnees protested these insults with a petition to the Emperor, who is said to have brought some criticism to bear upon the authorities involved.

With the return of increasing numbers of Ethiopians from study abroad, however, the prestige of a foreign degree has diminished, and the appearance of classes of locally educated A.B.'s, who have remained in the country to

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work, has further blurred the cleavage between returnees and locals. Finally, the returnees' growing awareness of their own "failure" has in many cases given them added sympathy toward the locals.

> The locals have as much right to live in the land as the returnees and as much duty to help the country. They should be given responsibility commensurate with what they are able to do. Doing serious work and being a leader do not require going abroad. We may find a leader in one of these kids. . . . In private life, I may not have much to do with them: I associate with a small group of friends, as does everyone; and you can't know everybody. But I have no contempt for the locals, and some of them are my best friends.
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> • • • •
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> The locals are the real patriots around here and the ones from whom real action will come.

The locals, in turn, seem to have become less suspicious that the returnees are looking down on them. Yet, in more recent years, they have found different grounds on which to be critical of the returnees. They see the returnees as alienated from Ethiopian life, withdrawn from public action, and consumed with private concerns, instead of living up to expectations and exercising dynamic leadership in the transformation of Ethiopian society.

> The returnees know nothing about Ethiopia when they leave, and when they come back they are just like the *faranj*. We, who have not studied much, cannot see far. We know little more than to do our daily routine. But they, who have the vision, don't do anything. They borrow thousands of dollars when they return, to buy furniture, rent a home, get a car, and so on; and that is all they think about.

The dissatisfaction of many locals with the returnees has in fact increased their own self-esteem and ambition to exert leadership themselves.

In terms of the total pattern of stratification in Ethiopia, however, the factors uniting locals and returnees outweigh those separating them. Despite differences of emphasis, they share a basic estrangement from the traditional masses and elites and a deep antagonism toward the government and most of the new nobility. They are unanimous in feeling that something is dreadfully wrong in the state of Ethiopia. Frequently they cannot articulate just what they object to, or else they seize upon some flagrant social evil as the bête noire: with the locals tending to be most outspoken against the widespread prostitution, or alcoholism, or the abuses of the courts, or the inequalities of wealth; and the returnees tending to single out inefficient practices in administration, or nepotism, or corruption in high places. Above all, perhaps, they share an increasing sense of *impatience*, a sense of being smothered in an archaic and stagnant social order, which they designate so expressively with

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instance, as contrasted with sentiments of mutuality and solidarity; in the second, as contrasted with a condition of numerous social obligations and constraints; in the third, as contrasted with anonymity and conformity. In so doing our attention will necessarily be directed to disparate orders of phenomena. The empirical referent of these three concepts of individualism will be studied as follows:

(1) *Egoism.*—The degree of individualistic disposition among the Amhara will be examined in terms of two measures: the extent to which individuals are attached to collective symbols and interests, and the extent to which interpersonal relations take non-solidaristic forms.

(2) *Independence.*—The degree of individualistic social organization will be examined with reference to the different institutional foci of Amhara life, and measured by the extent to which role definitions are permissive rather than prescriptive; the possibility of voluntary as opposed to compulsory associations; and the possibilities for the protection of individual rights.

(3) *Individuality.*—The degree of individuality will be measured by the extent to which originality and heroic excellence are valued in the media of self-development and self-expression customary in Amhara culture.

EGOISM VERSUS SOLIDARISM

Self and Community

To what extent are the Amhara bound to one another by a sense of community, and to what extent are their actions guided by a sense of identification with collective symbols and needs? One conspicuous area of such commitment lies in the realm of religious affiliation. The Amhara manifest a strong sense of solidarity with their coreligionists over against all those who do not wear a *mätab* and who have not been baptized. They are deeply attached to the several symbols of the church—the church building itself, the compound in which it is enclosed, the holy ark, and all representatives of ecclesiastical authority—and react to violations of the dignity and purity of their religious symbols as to a personal affront. On certain ceremonial occasions they march in procession around the church shouldering rifles and spears, indicating their determination to defend by force the integrity of their religious objects. In cases where church membership has been channeled along the lines of schismatic orders, the Amhara—particularly the monks—have defended their doctrines faithfully and have at times suffered martyrdom.

With respect to their territorial and linguistic groups, the Amhara seem similarly attached to their collective symbols, if with somewhat less passion than in the religious case. As we have seen, the Amhara has a keen sense of identification with his native locale, or *ägar*, and is readily disposed to defend it against all comers. The expression *yägarë lïjj* ("child of my country" or

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Landsmann) regularly evokes considerable sentiment. There is also a strong sense of solidarity based on the use of Amharic—both among the Amhara as a whole vis-à-vis other Ethiopians who either do not know Amharic or speak it imperfectly, and among regional dialect groups. The people of Gojjam and of the Gondar area are particularly chauvinistic with regard to the quality of their Amharic.

This attachment to symbols of religion, territory, and language is important in providing a basis for identity and morale. Yet these attachments are of relatively little import in shaping a self-transcending orientation in the day-to-day activities of the Amhara; for the crucial context of these activities is the local community, and in the civic sphere the Amhara manifest very little solidarity. Indeed, it may be said that the Amhara have virtually no sense of "community" at all, for the concept can scarcely be rendered in idiomatic Amharic.

The absence of community sentiment among the Amhara is implied by their ecology. Not only did the Amhara fail to produce extensive and durable urban centers (with the limited exception of Gondar) but their country is even barren of that frequent cornerstone of peasant life, the village. The Amhara have distributed themselves thinly, scattering in groups of fours and fives up and down their mountains and plateaus. Larger aggregations are found on the estates of noblemen, but these constitute expanded private households rather than civic communities. The Amhara justify this dispersion of their population on the grounds that wide spaces are needed for the grazing of livestock and that a man needs to live on the land he farms. But herding and farming have been carried out well enough elsewhere by people living together in villages, and it is quite probable that this ecological pattern is due as much as anything else to the Amhara's preference for not having too much association with those outside his immediate kin group. In his own words, the Amhara prefers the kind of neighbor who "does not push the boundaries" (*wassan aynakām*), and believes, as noted earlier, that *bēt-ennā māqbar labetchāw naw* ("home and the grave are by oneself"). It is a preference manifest in such solitary living arrangements as that of divorced women who sometimes live by themselves in the country, eking out a living by spinning cotton or brewing spirits, and in the age-old predilection of Abyssinian monks for anchoritism.

The moral counterpart of this ecological pattern is a preoccupation with private interests that leaves little room for the consideration of communal needs. According to the Amhara vocabulary of motives, social action is motivated first and foremost by the pursuit of *ṭiqem*, or narrowly conceived self-interest.[9] This matter-of-fact acceptance of egoistic motivation among the Amhara appears during what is a common occurrence: the shameless subversion of occasions which are set up to consider communal problems and to

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any case the *shĭftā* is a man apart, who makes his home in uninhabited mountainous country or lowlands and lives by stealing cattle and robbing travelers. Some Amhara become *shĭftā* because of a passion for this way of life; this is particularly true of soldiers who, after a long campaign, prefer the continuation of a predatory and free existence to a return to the hard work of the fields. Others do so involuntarily, in order to escape punishment after committing some violence in the course of a personal dispute.

The attitudes of civilian Amhara toward the *shĭftā* combine fear and dislike with a strong tendency toward idealization. The *shĭftā* is feared because he is a killer; if a person happens to witness him performing some act of theft or murder, he will usually keep quiet about it for fear of reprisal. He is disliked because he lives parasitically off the productive activities of others. But the *shĭftā* is widely admired, on the other hand, because he possesses a number of qualities that are dear to the Amhara. He is reputed to be an expert singer of *shĭllalā*. He is credited with unusually handsome features because, living at the expense of others as he does, he has plenty to eat and no arduous work to wear him down. Above all he is *guabaz*, the great Amhara virtue that embodies bravery, fierceness, hardihood, and general male competence. This is symbolized by the *shĭftā*'s letting his hair grow to the proportions of a *gofarē*, the wildly thick hair style of the warrior.

The Amhara's admiration for the *shĭftā* is reminiscent of American attitudes toward the outlaw in "western" films. In the Amhara case, however, this is not balanced by a corresponding idealization of a sheriff-figure as the representative of civil order. Although a feudal lord or governor who captures some *shĭftā* in his area may be admired, this admiration will be directed to his personal qualities of bravery or cunning far more than to his capacity as an agent of "law and order." There is no feeling among the Amhara that the *shĭftā* must be captured simply because he is an outlaw. Instead, a more pragmatic approach is taken: the *shĭftā* is acknowledged as a legitimate social type and is tolerated at a distance so long as his killing does not become wanton or excessive. This approach, and what, in the idealization of the *shĭftā*, appears to be a tendency to identify with someone who openly flaunts the norms of civil society, bespeaks a relatively weak commitment to the value of civil order.

The weakness of the Amhara's attachment to symbols of local community is paralleled by his parochialism with respect to more inclusive levels of community. This parochialism is manifest in diverse ways in the different social strata. Among the peasantry it appears, for example, as an aversion to arranging marriages and permitting land to pass to an Amhara from a different province. Among the clergy it has been expressed in terms of those regionally based doctrinal differences which have disrupted the church for many centuries. Among the nobility it has taken the form of incessant politi-

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cal animosities which have weakened the nobility as a status group both in relation to the emperor and in relation to foreign countries. Another respect in which Amhara parochialism has been expressed is the addiction to regional stereotypes, according to which the Tigrean has been depicted as flighty, irresponsible, and "dry"; the Gondarē as intolerably proud; the Gojjami as sly and treacherous; and the Shoan as calculating and untrustworthy. Despite its long history as a nation, Ethiopia probably never experienced more than the dimmest stirrings of a truly national sentiment among its people; and more than once in the past century have regional lords strengthened the hand of European powers in Ethiopia by seeking their help in the combat against other local rulers.

Self and Others

In addition to considering the extent to which the members of a society identify with the needs and symbols of their more inclusive collectivities, one may also define the individualistic disposition on the dimension of personal interaction. Egoism contrasts, in other words, not only with the disposition to perceive collective purposes as one's own, but also with the disposition to seek solidarity and mutuality in face-to-face relations.

This aspect of egoism/solidarism is studied by surveying the more important forms of interaction that appear in a given society. In the survey of elementary social behavior among the Amhara now to be reported, two criteria were used to establish the importance of any given form: (1) the frequency with which it was observed, and (2) the extent to which it was stylized or "institutionalized." These criteria were not embodied in any systematic observational procedures; the only control over the observer's bias here is my own deliberate effort to present a balanced and accurate picture.

We may begin by considering the more solidaristic forms. Interaction among the Amhara is characterized, first of all, by a sort of *sensuous camaraderie*. The Amhara enjoy bodily contact. Members of the same sex customarily hold one another's hands for long periods while conversing, or embrace one another in casual fellowship. Crowds of commoners cheerfully huddle close to one another on the floor through the night when they have assembled for some social function and cannot return home the same day. Relatives and companions of the same sex incline to sleep in one another's arms, at least in the chillier altitudes.

Both their style of dress and their manner of eating give the Amhara a ready way to express this comradely feeling. Their untailored cotton or wool cloth easily adapts itself to being shared. Except perhaps for individuals of high social status, the typical Amhara is ready to use his toga as a blanket-wrap for both himself and another whom he may scarcely know.

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113 Conceptions of Time and Space in the Amhara World View," *Atti del convegno internazionale di studi etiopici* (Rome: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1960), pp. 223–28.

8. Cf. Allan Hoben, "The Role of Ambilineal Descent Groups in Gojjam Amhara Social Organization" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1963), pp. 140 ff.
9. *Ibid.*, chaps. ii and v.
10. On Amhara attitudes toward nationhood cf. D. Levine, "Ethiopia: Identity, Authority, and Realism," *Political Culture and Political Development*, ed. L. Pye and S. Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).
11. Messing, "The Highland-Plateau Amhara," pp. 63–67, presents a detailed analysis of the ethnic hierarchy in Ethiopia "as it exists in the minds of most Amhara." Briefly summarized, this hierarchy consists, in order of descending status, of the (Christian) Tigre; Christianized Galla; Muslim and pagan Galla, and other sedentary Cushitic-speaking peoples who were self-governing prior to Menelik's conquests (Kaffa, Wollamo, etc.); peoples identified chiefly as manual laborers (Falasha, Gurage); and occupational hunters, pastoral nomads, and Negroid ex-slaves.

113 12. This subject is discussed in greater detail in D. Levine, "Ethiopia: Identity, Authority, and Realism," *op. cit.*

13. Marcel Griaule, "Le travail en Abyssinie," *Revue internationale du travail*, XXIII (February, 1931), p. 8.
14. This ideal is discussed at greater length in D. Levine, "The Concept of Masculinity in Ethiopian Culture" (paper presented at the Fourteenth Annual Symposium of the Committee on Human Development, The University of Chicago, May 11, 1963: to be published in the *International Journal of Social Psychiatry*).
15. *The Primitive World and Its Transformations* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954), chap. iv; and *The Little Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), chap. vi.
16. Cf. Messing, "The Highland-Plateau Amhara," p. 540.

000 17. Harris observed that "the Abyssinian scribe does not hold the pen of a ready writer; and the dilatory management of his awkward implement is attended with gestures and attitudes the most ridiculous." Also, "Few of the priesthood understand the art of writing, and all regard the exercise of the pen as shameful and derogatory." *The Highlands of Ethiopia* (3 vols.; London, 1844), III, 15, 182.

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18. Cf. Benjamin Paul, ed. *Health, Culture, and Community* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1955).
19. See a series of articles beginning in the *Ethiopian Herald*, Addis Ababa, June 27, 1960: "Let the Victim Speak of the Magnitude of Ethiopian Medicine."

000 20. A long-term study of this and related problems is currently being carried out under the supervision of the US/AID Public Health Section in Ethiopia.

113 21. For general analyses of the nature of political life which support this assertion, cf. Edward Shils, *The Torment of Secrecy* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956);